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Abstract In this paper we analyze performance of practical
robust data-hiding in channels with geometrical transforma-
tions. By applying information-theoretic argument we show
that performance of a system designed based on both ran-
dom coding and random binning principles is bounded by
the same maximal achievable rate for the cases when com-
munication channel includes geometrical transformations or
not. Targeting to provide theoretic performance limits of
practical robust data-hiding we model it using a multiple ac-
cess channel (MAC) with side information (SI) available at
one of encoders and present the bounds on achievable rates
of reliable communications to such a protocol. Finally, con-
sidering template-based and redundant-based design of geo-
metrically robust data-hiding systems, we perform security
analysis of their performance and present results in terms of
number of trial efforts the attacker needs to completely re-
move hidden information.
Keywords Security analysis · Robust data-hiding ·
Structured codebooks · Geometrical synchronization ·
Multiple access channel
1 Introduction
Digital data-hiding is the art of information communication
by embedding it into some digital multimedia documents.
Being embedded, this information should be reliably decod-
able even if some intentional and unintentional attacks were
applied to the marked document.
In general case, the digital data-hiding can be consid-
ered as a game between the data-hider and the attacker.
O’Sullivan, Moulin and Ettinger were among the first who
recognized this game [1]. In the extended version of the pre-
vious paper [2], Moulin and O’Sullivan have considered two
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possible set-ups. In the first set-up they assumed the avail-
ability of host at both encoder and decoder, i.e., the so-called
private game and in the second one they considered a case,
where the host is available only at the encoder, i.e., public
game. Moulin and O’Sullivan considered the games with the
coding capacity as a cost function. Moreover, they assumed
that the decoder is informed of the attack channel, and thus,
applied maximum likelihood (ML) decoding.
The knowledge of the attack channel at the decoder is
not a very common case for most practical applications.
More realistic set-up was considered by Somekh-Baruch and
Merhav [3, 4] in assumption that the attacker strategy is not
known neither to encoder nor decoder. Moreover, they sup-
posed that any conditional pdf that satisfies certain energy
constraint might be a valid attacker choise. In particular,
in [3] Somekh-Baruch and Merhav have considered private
game, where both capacity and error exponent were ana-
lyzed as the cost functions. The channel capacity is a good
measure of performance, if one is interested to know the
maximum rate of reliable communications. In fact, one can
consider it as the maximum number of distinct messages that
can be communicated via a given host data. The error expo-
nent provides the lowest achievable probability of error at a
given information rate. From the practical point of view, the
error exponents seem to be more attractive since they bring
out clear and simple relationship between error probability,
data rate, constraint length, and channel behaviour [5]. A re-
markable result has been achieved since the attack channel
was not known at the decoder [3] using maximum mutual
information (MMI) decoding. This decoding strategy can be
considered as universal decoding for this class of channels.
Such a decoder can be regarded as a two part system that
consists of channel state estimation (CSE) and decoder for
the particular CSE output. These two procedures are iterated
to guarantee the reliable communications at rates below the
channel capacity defined by the max-min game.
In more recent paper [4], Somekh-Baruch and Merhav
have considered capacity of a public game using the same
MMI decoding set-up. Being theoretically justified, this
approach meets some difficulties in practical applications
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dealing with geometrical channels. In such kind of channels,
the attacker applies some desynchronization transform to the
watermarked data from a set of parametric transforms with
large cardinality. On the data-hider side, the applied trans-
form can be regarded as a random one with the uniform
probability of appearance over the set of chosen cardinality.
To simplify the task of the decoder, most of data-hiding
systems use certain simplifications that lead to the sub-
optimal performance of universal decoder. First, the CSE-
decoding is implemented in the sequential two-step man-
ner rather than in iterative way. Once one obtains the CSE,
the channel state compensation (CSC) is applied and the
message decoding is based directly on the recovered data.
Second, to simplify the task of CSE, most of data-hiding
techniques are exploiting specially structured codebooks.
This is closely related to the use of special pilot or template
signals that facilitate estimation problem often used in digi-
tal communications. In the following, we will refer to these
codebooks as geometrically structured codebooks. Depend-
ing on the particular codebook design, they might be classi-
fied into two main groups:
• template-based structured codebooks in which a spe-
cially designed template or a pilot data is used to perform
CSE and CSC [6, 7];
• redundant-based structured codebooks in which code-
words have special construction or statistics to aid CSE
and CSC [8–11].
Although the practical usefulness of CSE and CSC was
demonstrated in the papers referred above, a thorough theo-
retical analysis of this geometrical synchronization frame-
work still remains an open and a little studied problem.
Therefore, to theoretically justify the design rules of these
practical data-hiding techniques, we suggest to consider
this problem within information-theoretic framework. More-
over, such a justification might introduce a common basis
for the analysis of these techniques using well-established
practical communications principles of synchronization via
CSE/CSC.
This analysis can be also quite indicative while consid-
ering security leakages of robust data-hiding schemes based
on the structured codebooks. Security leakages of structured
codebooks should be investigated from the position of de-
signing the worst case attacks to destroy the reliable com-
munications. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to put more
light on the security and information-theoretical analysis of
geometrically robust data-hiding.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2,
an information-theoretic analysis of data-hiding is pre-
sented. In Sect. 3, the impact of geometrical attacks on the
communications performance is considered. Afterwards, in
Sect. 4, the information-theoretic framework to data-hiding
synchronization is provided. Sections 5 and 6 contain the
analysis of the template-based structured codebooks and
the redundant-based structured codebooks, respectively. In
Sect. 7, the security leaks and attacking strategies for each
structured codebook group are investigated. Finally, Sect. 8
concludes the paper.
Notations
We use capital letters to denote scalar random variables X ,
bold capital letters to denote vector random variables X,
corresponding small letters x and x to designate the real-
ization of scalar and vector random variables, respectively.
The superscript N is used to denote length-N vectors x =
x N = {x[1], x[2], . . . , x[N ]} with i th element x[i]. We use
X ∼ pX (x) or simply X ∼ p(x) to indicate that a random
variable X is distributed according to pX (x). Calligraphic
fonts X designate sets X ∈ X and |X | denotes the cardinal-
ity of the set X . Z and R stand for the set of integers and the
set of real numbers, respectively. H(X) denotes the entropy
of a random variable X and I (X; Y ) designates the mutual
information between random variables X and Y .
2 Information-theoretic analysis of data-hiding
Block diagram of a generic data-hiding system is presented
in Fig. 1.
A stego data y ∈ YN is obtained by adding a watermark
sequence w ∈WN to a cover data x ∈ X N according to:
Y = W + X. (1)
W is generated by the encoder based on the message in-
dex M that is uniformly distributed over the set M =
{1, 2, . . . , |M|}, where |M| = 2N R , the key K ∈ K,K =
{1, 2, . . . , |K|}, and, possibly, the host X. R = 1N log2 |M|
is the rate of communications.
The realization of key determines a particular codebook
to be used at both encoder and decoder during communica-
tions. The codebooks are generated randomly and revealed
to encoder and decoder with the knowledge of correspond-
ing keys.
Depending on whether or not non-causal host state infor-
mation X is taken into account in the watermark sequence
generation, random binning or random coding are used for
codebook design, respectively. In the random coding, Fig. 2
Fig. 1 Communication set-up for data-hiding
Fig. 2 Communications scenario based on random coding
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Fig. 3 Communications scenario based on random binning
[12], the encoder sends the codeword W(M, K ), which cor-
responds to a particular realization of M in the codebook
determined by K , as the watermark sequence. In the ran-
dom binning, Fig. 3 [13], in the codebook defined by K ,
the encoder seeks a codeword U in the bin determined by
M , which is jointly-typical with X [13]. After finding the
jointly-typical (U, X) pair, the encoder generates the wa-
termark sequence W(M, X, K ) according to a probabilistic
mapping p(w | u, x).
The watermark sequence combined with the host data
is sent to a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) that con-
verts the input Y to the output V in a probabilistic man-
ner according to the channel transition probability p(v|y) =
∏N
i=1 p(vi |yi ).
At the decoder, M̂ is decoded from V with the knowl-
edge of K . In the random coding, the decoder looks through
the codebook defined by K for the codeword W(M̂, K )
which is jointly typical with V. When such a unique code-
word W(M̂, K ) is found, the index M̂ is declared as the de-
coded message. In the random binning, the decoder looks for
a codeword U that is jointly-typical with V in the K -defined
codebook. When such a unique codeword U is found, the
index M̂ of the bin that contains U is considered as the de-
coded message.
3 Influence of geometrical attacks
on the communications performance
3.1 Modeling of geometrical attacks
When a geometrical transformation TA(.) is applied to Y, its
pixel coordinates are modified accordingly.1 The result V of
these operations is called the attacked data:
V = TA(Y), (2)
where the subscript A represents the type of the geometrical
transformation applied to Y. Affine, bilinear and projective
transformations are examples that A can take.
1 It should be noticed here that we did not assume memory effects
in the channel due to the intersymbol interference caused by the inter-
polation.
Fig. 4 The space A of all possible geometrical tranformations and its
particular element A = a
A can be parameterized by a set of J parameters a =
(a1, a2, . . . , aJ ) such that a ∈ ZJ .2 For example, when A
takes the form of the affine subclass of general geometri-
cal transformations, a pixel at coordinates (n1, n2) in Y, i.e.,
y[n1, n2], will be transferred to the new coordinates (n′1, n′2)
in V, i.e., v[n′1, n′2], according to:
[
n′1
n′2
]
=
[
a1 a2
a3 a4
] [
n1
n2
]
+
[
a5
a6
]
. (3)
In this case, a = (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6). If we assume that
Fig. 4 represents the space A of all possible geometrical
transformations, then a particular transformation A = a will
be represented by a dot in this space. Total number of ele-
ments in this space is defined by the cardinality |A|.
However, in practical data-hiding applications, an inten-
tional geometrical attack space would not include all ele-
ments of A due to the visual acceptability constraint. For
example, it is not expected that the attacker would rotate a
stego data more than for 10 degrees. Therefore, without loss
of generality, we will consider the set of −typical geomet-
rical transformations A(J ) (A) [12], such that the sample en-
tropy is −close to the true entropy and |A(J ) | < |A|, as
the space of possibly applied geometrical transformations.
In the case when a ∈ RJ , we refer to the volume of a set
instead of cardinality [12].
If the parameters of a = (a1, a2, . . . , aJ ) are dis-
tributed independently and identically according to p(a),
then, |A(J ) | will be upper bounded as [12]:
|A(J ) | ≤ 2J (H(A)+), (4)
where H(A) = −∑ p(a) log2 p(a) and the summation is
performed over the set of values that a can take.
It should be noticed that most of practically important
families of geometrical transformations can be represented
by a finite number of parameters, e.g., translation (2), affine
transforms (6), bilinear transforms (8), projective transforms
(10). At the same time, the local random transformations in-
troduced in Stirmark Benchmark [14] might require larger
number of parameters. This is true for the case considered
by Voloshynovskiy et al. [10], where it was shown a pos-
sibility of random bending attack representation by a set of
local affine transforms. In this case, J depens on the image
2 In general case, one can assume a ∈ RJ .
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size, i.e., it is defined by the number of blocks used for local
approximation times number of affine transform parameters.
However, besides the drastic increase of J , the upper bound
(4) remains valid for our analysis.
3.2 Achievable rates of data-hiding in channels
with geometrical transformations
Consider a theoretical communications set-up, where the de-
coder neither has a geometrical synchronization framework
for recovery nor a priori knowledge about the applied geo-
metrical transformation. It is inevitable for this decoder to
regard all elements of A(J ) as possibly applied ones and,
thus, to perform an exhaustive decoding for each a ∈ A(J ) .
In the following sections, achievability of reliable com-
munications in channels with geometrical transformations
is analyzed for random coding and random binning strate-
gies starting from a communications scenario without any
geometrical transformations. The analysis is carried out for
the theoretic set-ups, where the lengths of communicated se-
quences asymptotically approach infinity.
Reliability of the communications is measured by a
probability of decoding error, Pe, that is the probability that
the decoded message M̂ is not equal to the sent message M ,
i.e., Pr [M̂ = m|M = m].
3.2.1 Communication set-ups based on random coding
In the case of random coding, the decoder will make a de-
coding error in following situations [12]:
• There is not any codeword W, which is jointly-typical
with V in the codebook determined by K : According to
the asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) [12], this
event is unlikely.
• Another codeword W′ from the codebook such that(
W′ = w|W = w) is jointly-typical with V: According
to the AEP, any W′ from the K−defined codebook and
V constitutes a jointly typical pair with the probability
2−N (I (W ;V |K )−), where  is an arbitrary small positive
number, i.e.,  → 0. Since there are (2N RRC − 1) differ-
ent W′ apart from W′ = w in a particular codebook, the
probability of decoding error in the random coding case,
PRC(N )e , is upper bounded by:
PRC(N )e ≤ 2N RRC2−N (I (W ;V |K )−), (5)
where RRC is the random coding-based communication rate
in channels without geometrical transformations. If RRC sat-
isfies the condition:
RRC ≤ I (W ; V |K ) − , (6)
then, PRC(N )e → 0, as N → ∞ and  → 0.
In channels with geometrical transformations, when the
decoding is performed at all elements of the space A(J ) , the
upper bound in (5) becomes:
PRC(N )e ≤ |A(J ) |2N R
G
RC2−N (I (W ;V |K )−),
≤ 2N 1N log2 |A(J ) |2N RGRC2−N (I (W ;V |K )−),
≤ 2N ( 1N log2 |A(J ) |+RGRC−(I (W ;V |K )−)), (7)
where RGRC is the random coding-based communication rate
in channels with geometrical transformations. Therefore, if
RGRC satisfies the condition:
RGRC ≤ I (W ; V |K ) −  −
1
N
log2
∣
∣A(J )
∣
∣, (8)
PRC(N )e → 0, as N → ∞ and  → 0. Moreover, taking into
account (4), (8) can be rewritten in the following form:
RGRC ≤ I (W ; V |K ) −  −
J (H(A) + )
N
. (9)
As N → ∞ and  → 0 and A(J ) is finite, J (H(A)+)N term
in (9) vanishes and the upper bound on RGRC reduces to:
RGRC ≤ I (W ; V |K ) − , (10)
which coincides with (6) that bounds the rate in channels
without geometrical transformations.
To prove the converse part of coding theorem for ran-
dom coding based communications in channels with ge-
ometrical transformations one can exploit standard proof
technique [12] in order to upper bound the rate RGRC
+ 1N log2 | A(J ) |. Due to the imposed constraint on |A(J ) |
it is easy to show that the impact of the log term in the sum
rate asymptotically vanishes.
Therefore, based on the above consideration one can
conclude that in a theoretical set-up based on random cod-
ing scenario, the maximum rate of reliable communications
is not affected by the applied geometrical transformations.
3.2.2 Communication set-ups based on random binning
In the case of random binning, one encounters with a coding
error in following situations:
Encoder:
• There is not any codeword U in the codebook defined
by K , which is jointly-typical with X: According to the
AEP, any codeword U and X may form a jointly-typical
pair with the probability 2−N (I (U ;X |K )−). Since there
are 2N R′ codewords U for any M in a particular code-
book defined by K , the probability of this event will be
bounded by
P RB(N )e1 ≤
(
1 − 2−N (I (U ;X |K )−))2N R
′
,
≤ exp ( − 2N (R′−I (U ;X |K )+)), (11)
where we used the fact that (1 − x)n ≤ e−nx . If R′ >
I (U ; X |K ) − , P RB(N )e1 → 0 as N → ∞ and  → 0.
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Decoder:
• There is not any codeword U in the K−defined code-
book, which is jointly-typical with V: According to the
AEP, this event is unlikely.
• A codeword U from another bin M̂ such that(
M̂ = m|M = m) is jointly-typical with V: According
to the AEP, arbitrary codeword U from the codebook
defined by K and V may form a jointly-typical pair
with the probability 2−N (I (U ;V |K )−). Since there are(
2N RRB − 1) bins in total with an index M̂ such that
M̂ = m, the probability of decoding error in the random
binning case, P RB(N )e2 , is upper bounded by:
P RB(N )e2 ≤ 2N [RRB+R
′]2−N (I (U ;V |K )−), (12)
where R′ = I (U ; X |K ) +  and RRB is the random
binning-based communication rate in channels without
geometrical transformations.
If the data-hider communicates with the following con-
dition on the rate:
RRB ≤ I (U ; V |K ) − I (U ; X |K ) − 2, (13)
then, P RB(N )e2 → 0, as N → ∞ and  → 0.
In channels with geometrical transformations, when the
decoder performs the decoding at all elements of the space of
typical geometrical transformations, P RB(N )e2 will be upper
bounded by:
P RB(N )e2 ≤
∣
∣A(J )
∣
∣2N [RGRB+R′]2−N (I (U ;V |K )−),
≤ 2N 1N log2 |A(J ) |2N [RGRB+I (U ;X |K )+]
× 2−N (I (U ;V |K )−),
≤ 2N ( log2 |A
(J )

N |+RGRB+I (U ;X |K )−I (U ;V |K )), (14)
where RGRB is the random binning-based communication
rate in channels with geometrical transformations. If RGRB
is such that:
RGRB ≤ I (U ; V |K ) − I (U ; X |K ) − 2
− 1
N
log2
∣
∣A(J )
∣
∣, (15)
P RB(N )e2 → 0, as N → ∞ and  → 0. Furthermore, similar
to (9), 1N log2 |A(J ) | term in (15) vanishes as N → ∞ and
A(J ) is finite. Then, the upper bound for RGRB becomes:
RGRB ≤ I (U ; V |K ) − I (U ; X |K ) − 2, (16)
which is equivalent to the condition on RRB given in (13)
for channels without geometrical transformations.
Similarly to the Sect. 3.2.1, in order to prove the con-
verse of coding theorem for random binning based commu-
nications in channels with geometrical transformations one
can show using the same argument as in [13] that the log
term in RGRB + 1N log2 |A(J ) | has not asymptotic impact on
the reliable communications.
Thus, in theoretical set-ups with random binning, the re-
liable communications do not suffer from geometrical trans-
formations.
3.3 Synchronization Impact on the performance
of data-diding
Assume that the probability of decoding error for a particu-
lar realization of A = a is equal to P(N )e (a) for watermark
codewords of length N . Then, the average probability of de-
coding error PG(N )e over all possible attacks can be com-
puted by averaging P(N )e (a) as:
PG(N )e =
∑
a∈A(J )
P(N )e (a)pA(a). (17)
As it was shown in the previous section, in the theoreti-
cal set-up, when the length of the communicated sequences
asymptotically approaches infinity, performance of random
coding-based and random binning-based communications in
channels without and with geometrical transformations in
terms of achievable rates asymptotically coincides.
However, in practical situations with a finite N , the
encoding is based on random binning or random coding
with expurgating bad codewords depending on whether the
host state is taken into account or not in the encoding.
The decoding is based on a ML technique [15] and PG(N )e
is upper bounded by PG(N )e ≤ |A(J ) |2−N Er (R|K ), where
Er (R|K ) = maxρ∈[0,1] maxpW |K (w|k)[E0(ρ, pW |K (w|k)) −
ρR] and E0(ρ, pW |K (w|k)) = − log2
∑
y[
∑
x pW |K (w|k)
p(y|w) 11+ρ ]1+ρ . Furthermore, as |A(J ) | gets larger, the up-
per bound for PG(N )e increases. Hence, in the case of practi-
cal set-ups, geometrical transformations completely disable
the reliable communications.
In many practical applications, it is necessary to decrease
the cardinality of search space of the decoder for possible ge-
ometrical transformations to decrease the average probabil-
ity of decoding error in practical cases. A way to accomplish
this requirement is to introduce a synchronization frame-
work into the scheme in the expense of dedicating some
portion of the rate R, originally used for the message trans-
mission, to the communication of synchronization data that
definitely lead to some loss of maximum achievable rate. In
the asymptotic case, when N → ∞, P(N )e → 0 and there
is no need in such a synchronization. However, in practi-
cal set-ups, particular N determines P(N )e and the relation-
ship between the cardinality of |A(J ) | and P(N )e defines the
loss in performance. Depending on this relationship it might
be beneficial to reduce the rate of communication spending
same part for the synchronization as the gain in considerable
decreasing |A(J ) |, keeping P(N )e in the given range.
As an illustrative example, in Fig. 5a, a dot repre-
sents a particular geometrical transformation A = a in the
space A(J ) of typical geometrical transformations. A de-
coder without a synchronization framework will consider
all elements of this space as possibly applied geometrical
transformation, i.e., it will perform decoding at each point
of this space. However, the use of a geometrical synchro-
nization framework reduces the search space from A(J ) to
A′ (Fig. 5b).
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Fig. 5 The original geometrical search space A(J ) (a) and the con-
strained search spaceA′ after application of CSE/CSC (b)
The cardinality of A′, i.e., |A′|, is determined by the ac-
curacy of CSE and CSC and depends on a particular design
of structured codebook that can be achieved analyzing cor-
responding Cramer-Rao lower bounds [12]. As the variance
of the estimation error goes to zero, constrained search space
A′ reduces to |A′| = 1 (A = a, Fig. 5).
4 Practical framework for information-theoretic
consideration of geometrically-robust data-hiding codes
The host interference to the message communication is
an essential problem in the design of a practical capacity
achieving robust data-hiding. The message encoding based
on the random binning dependent on host state provides the
solution to this problem. In contrast, robustness to geometri-
cal attacks with an acceptable complexity of protocol design
requires the codewords of the synchronization part to have
special features that are independent from the statistics of
the host data.
In order to resolve these conflicting requirements, we
propose the information-theoretic set-up presented in Fig. 6
that is based on a memoryless MAC with side information
(SI) about the host state X non-causally available at one of
the encoders. It consists of four alphabets W1,W2,X and
Fig. 6 MAC framework to geometrically robust data-hiding: (a) main
diagram and (b) equivalent channel
V , and is denoted by {W1 ×W2,X , p(v|y),V}. We also as-
sume that the keys K1 and K2 are available at corresponding
encoders and decoders.
Inputs to the channel, W1 and W2, are parts of the wa-
termark W where W1 is dedicated to pure message commu-
nication and W2 is additionally used for geometrical syn-
chronization purposes. Message M to be communicated is
split into two parts, M1 and M2, depending on the rate pair
(R1, R2) and they are encoded into W1 and W2 using corre-
sponding encoders.
A (2N R1, 2N R2, N ) code for the MAC with SI consists
of two message sets:
M1 = {1, 2, . . . , 2N R1}, (18)
M2 = {1, 2, . . . , 2N R2}, (19)
two encoding functions:
f1 : {1, 2, . . . , 2N R1} × {1, 2, . . . , |K1|} × X N
→WN1 , (20)
f2 : {1, 2, . . . , 2N R2} × {1, 2, . . . , |K2|} →WN2 , (21)
and a decoding function:
g : VN × {1, 2, . . . , |K1|} × {1, 2, . . . , |K2|} (22)
→ {1, 2, . . . , 2N R1} × {1, 2, . . . , 2N R2}.
M1 and M2 are chosen randomly from the sets
{1, 2, . . . , 2N R1} and {1, 2, . . . , 2N R2}, respectively. The
keys K1 and K2 determine the particular codebooks that
are used by corresponding encoders and decoders. Assum-
ing that joint distribution of messages over the product set
M1 ×M2 is uniform, the average probability of error for
this code is defined as:
P(N )e =
1
2N (R1+R2)
×
∑
(m1,m2)∈M1×M2
Pr[g(V, K1, K2) = (m1, m2)|
(M1 = m1, M2 = m2)]. (23)
A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable, if there ex-
ists a (2N R1, 2N R2, N ) code with P(N )e → 0 as N → ∞.
The capacity region of the MAC is the closure of the set of
all achievable (R1, R2) rate pairs.
Codebook construction: Codebooks for W1 and W2
when generated randomly according to random binning [13]
and random coding [12] principles, respectively, are re-
vealed to corresponding encoders and decoders.
Encoding: A particular message M is partitioned into
(M1, M2) depending on the rate pair (R1, R2). Then, the en-
coder for M1 generates W1(M1, X, K1) using random bin-
ning by taking into account M1, non-causal host state infor-
mation X and the user-specified key K1. Similarly, encoder
for M2 produces the codeword W2(M2, K2) using random
coding by considering M2 and the particular key K2. After-
wards, these two codewords are combined with the host state
X and sent to the equivalent channel. Information transfer
via this channel passes the following stages.
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Geometrical Transformation: Attacker applies a geomet-
rical transformation TA(.) from the set of -typical geomet-
rical transformations A(J ) (A) to the stego data Y.
Probabilistic Channel: In order to prevent complete in-
version of the applied geometrical transformation, the at-
tacker might introduce additional noise to the attacked data
V′.3 Assuming that the noise acts as a discrete memoryless
channel (DMC), it converts the input V′ to the output V′′
in a probabilistic manner according to the channel transition
probability p(v′′|v′) = ∏Ni=1 p(v′′i |v′i ).
Synchronization: The output V′′ of the probabilistic
channel is provided to CSE and CSC blocks for the syn-
chronization. In fact, this is the part where the cardinality
of the search space of the decoder for possibly applied ge-
ometrical transformations is reduced from |A(J ) | to |A′|.
The output V of this part is sent to decoders. Geometri-
cal transformation, probabilistic channel and synchroniza-
tion part form the equivalent channel with the input alpha-
bets W1, W2, X and the output alphabet V . Leaving the
problem of intersymbol interference (ISI) outside of the
scope of this paper, we assume that the channel output is
produced according to the probabilistic mapping p(v|y) =
∏N
i=1 p(vi |yi ).
Decoding: At the lower decoder (Fig. 6) with the knowl-
edge of the key K2, M̂2 is decoded first from V considering
W1 as interference. Then, the output of this decoder (in as-
sumption of errorless decoding of M2), W2, is provided to
upper decoder and M̂1 is decoded from V, with the knowl-
edge of the key K1, after subtracting W2 (genie-aided de-
coding [16]). In this way, the interference of W2 with respect
to W1 is avoided.
The corresponding achievable rates for the given set-up
have been investigated independently for non-watermarking
applications in [17]:
R1 ≤ 1N [I (U; V|W2, K1) − I (U; X|K1)] , (24)
R2 ≤ 1N [I (W2; V|U, K2) − I (U; X, |K1)] , (25)
R1 + R2 ≤ 1N [I (U, W2; V|K1, K2) − I (U; X|K1)], (26)
The achievable rate region for the proposed set-up is pre-
sented in Fig. 7. We would like to communicate with the
highest possible (R1, R2) pair satisfying (25). Actually, all
(R1, R2) pairs located on the line between the points P1 and
P2 of the achievable rate region in Fig. 7 agree with (25).
However, it is known from [12] that non-corner points can
be achieved only by time sharing (or space sharing in our
particular application). Therefore, the selection of corners is
motivated by the technical design concerns.
In practice, only a small fraction of energy/space will
be spent for W2 communications. This means that R2 will
be very small and asymptotically it will tend to zero as
N → ∞. Therefore, the plot will have notably "asymmet-
3 The noise in general can be signal dependent that takes into ac-
count interpolation effects.
Fig. 7 Achievable rate region of the proposed set-up
ric" character meaning that practically all rate will be as-
signed to R1. Therefore, asymptotically the difference be-
tween the maximum achievable rate R1 under N → ∞ and
R1 will be negligibly small for practical usage.
According to the particular way of the synchronization
part W2 design, structured codebooks can be divided into
two main groups: template-based structured codebooks and
redundant-based structured codebooks. In the following sec-
tions, the properties of these two groups will be investigated
in more details.
5 Template-based structured codebooks
The main idea of template-based synchronization is to use
a specially designed pilot to estimate possible geometrical
transformations applied to the stego data. Template data it-
self does not contain any information about the ongoing
message transfer, i.e., R2 = 0. It is key-dependent, W2(K2),
unique for a given key K2 = k2 which is shared by en-
coder and decoder. Once the geometrical transformation is
estimated and inverted based on the template W2, W1 is de-
coded from V after interference of W2 is canceled by sub-
traction.
The codebook construction with a template can be
considered using code division multiple access (CDMA)
and space division multiple access (SDMA) signaling ap-
proaches.
In the case of CDMA, W1 and W2 are transmitted si-
multaneously using power sharing since there is a constraint
on the power of the total input signal W = W1 + W2 to
the channel defined by the distortion E[d(X, Y)] ≤ σ 2W ,
where d(X, Y) = 1N
∑N
i=1 d(xi , yi ). It means that, if the
total watermark power is σ 2W , then λσ
2
W portion will be as-
signed to the communication of W1 and the rest, (1−λ)σ 2W ,
will be used to communicate W2. Obviously, as N → ∞,
then λ → 1 and negligibly small fraction of total watermark
power is spent for the template communication. An example
of template-based structured codebook based on CDMA is
given in Fig. 8.
In the case of SDMA, transmission of W1 and W2 is
performed in orthogonal space intervals. Thus, interference
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Fig. 8 CDMA template-based structured codebooks
Fig. 9 SDMA template-based structured codebooks
between these two data is avoided. An example of template-
based structured codebook based on SDMA is given in
Fig. 9.
6 Redundant-based structured codebooks
In redundant-based structured codebooks, W2 conveys M2
part of the message M , i.e., R2 = 0, using codewords that
have a special construction or statistics designed to aid the
synchronization. Once the geometrical transformation is in-
verted using the special structure of W2 and M2 is decoded
without error from V, then W1 is decoded after W2(M2) is
subtracted from V.
As in the case of template-based structured codebooks,
there are CDMA and SDMA approaches for the construction
of redundant-based structured codebooks. An example of
redundant-based structured codebook using CDMA is given
Fig. 10 CDMA redundant-based structured codebooks
Fig. 11 SDMA redundant-based structured codebooks
in Fig. 10 and another example based on SDMA is presented
in Fig. 11.
7 Analysis of security leaks and attacking strategies
The objective of the attacker that operates between the en-
coder and the decoder would be to exploit all available prior
information about the data-hiding scheme and all security
leakages from the observed stego data Y to destroy reli-
able communications. In order to comply with Kerckhoff
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principle [18] in the design of a secure data-hiding scheme,
it is assumed that the attacker has access to encoding and
decoding algorithms and has the knowledge of codebooks
used at both encoders and decoders as the prior information.
Furthermore, it is supposed that the attacker does not know:
• secret keys K1 and K2 or particular codebooks that are
exploited by encoders and decoders for ongoing commu-
nications,
• indexes M1 and M2 that are sent by corresponding en-
coders,
• the original host image X that carries communicated wa-
termark codewords W1 and W2.
Under given conditions, the attacker may apply one of
the following attacking strategies:
• Statistical signal processing attacks: the attacker exploit-
ing the knowledge of statistics of the watermark and of
the host data may estimate the watermark, subtract the
estimate from the stego data and add noise, thus avoiding
inverse mapping, to decrease the rate of reliable commu-
nications;
• Geometrical attacks: the attacker may find signal pro-
cessing attacks inefficient since in some cases they are
even invertible [19] and may decide to increase the com-
plexity of decoding for the data-hider applying a geo-
metrical attack to the stego data for desynchronization,
which is simple in terms of implementation;
• Key space search attacks: the attacker with an access
to the decoder and with the knowledge of codebooks
may prefer to perform “cryptographic like” attack by de-
coding through all possible codebooks, i.e., exhaustive
search, and to subtract the decoded codeword from the
stego data to destroy the communications. Due to the
equivocation, every codebook has some security leaks
that could simplify the search of the attacker [20]. More-
over, for robustness to geometrical attacks, we further
introduce redundancy into the codebook structure. Thus,
the attacker may try to benefit from the particular code-
book design in reducing the search space.
In the following sections, attacking scenarios that are
inspired by the given strategies for each group of struc-
tured codebooks based on the proposed MAC framework
will be investigated in details for theoretical set-ups, i.e., for
N → ∞.
7.1 Attacks against template-based structured codebooks
Attacks against template-based structured codebooks bene-
fit from the fact that template W2 is only key-dependent and
unique for a particular key K2 = k2. Thus, the attacker with
the access to codebooks given in Fig. 8 would look for a
jointly-typical pair (Ŵ2, Y). The cardinality of the W2 de-
coding space for the attacker is |K2|, where |K2| represents
the total number of codebooks for W2. If Ŵ2 is found, the
attacker would subtract it from Y and apply a geometrical
transform A to (Y − Ŵ2). In this case, the data-hider will
loose the synchronization framework based on W2 after this
attack.
After Ŵ2 is successfully decoded, instead of applying
some geometrical transformation to (Y − Ŵ2), the attacker
may further develop following attacks based on security
leaks, depending on the key management protocol for K1
and K2:
• The data-hider uses the same key at both encoders, i.e.,
K1 = K2 = K , and there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the codebooks of W1 and W2 for a given
key K : the knowledge of template W2 implies the knowl-
edge of corresponding codebook for W1 in such a de-
sign. After revealing W2 from a decoding space with car-
dinality |K2|, the attacker would search in that particular
codebook for a U that is jointly-typical with (Y − Ŵ2).
The cardinality of this U decoding space is 2N (R1+R′).
After finding U, the attacker can also obtain X. For ex-
ample, in the Costa set-up [21], which is proposed for
the Gaussian formulation of the Gel’fand-Pinsker prob-
lem [13], U = W1 + αX. Since Y − Ŵ2 = X + W1,
X can be calculated if the jointly-typical (U, (Y − Ŵ2))
pair is found. The possibility for the attacker to obtain
X means the total failure of the communications. Thus,
the cardinality of the decoding space for the attacker is
bounded by |K2| + 2N (R1+R′).
• The data-hider has different keys for each encoder, i.e.,
K1 = K2, and there is no relationship between the code-
books of W1 and W2 [7]: this time the knowledge of
template W2 does not provide any information about the
codebook from which current W1 in the stego data is
coming. The attacker may perform an exhaustive search
in all |K1| codebooks for the U that is jointly-typical
with (Y − Ŵ2). The cardinality of this U decoding
space is |K1|2N (R1+R′) that results in total cardinality of
|K2| + |K1|2N (R1+R′).
• The data-hider has different keys for each encoder, i.e.,
K1 = K2, but K2 is fixed and is the same for all users
[6]: using the same template for all users, i.e., |K2| = 1,
makes the scheme more susceptible to the attacks. Thus,
when compared to the previous cases, it is relatively easy
for the attacker to find W2. However, in terms of de-
stroying the reliable communications, the same exhaus-
tive search should be performed in all |K1| codebooks
for a jointly-typical (U, (Y − Ŵ2)) pair with a decoding
space of the cardinality |K1|2N (R1+R′). Thus, the over-
all cardinality of the decoding space for the attacker is
1 + |K1|2N (R1+R′).
Therefore, it is beneficial for the data-hider to keep dif-
ferent keys for each encoder.
7.2 Attacks against redundant-based structured codebooks
In the case of redundant-based structured codebooks, code-
words are generated having special features or statistics
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to facilitate the geometrical synchronization at the decoder
[8–10]. Therefore, one would expect the attacker to benefit
from these statistics in the search of W2 part. By observ-
ing the stego data Y, the attacker could learn the statistics
of W2 even when the key K2 is not available. Furthermore,
the knowledge of statistics for W2 reduces the ambiguity in
finding W2. For the attacker with an access to the codebooks
given in Fig. 10, the upper bound for the cardinality of the
W2 decoding space is |K2|2N R2 .
An additional analysis should be provided for the prob-
ability that the attacker will find another Ŵ2 from the code-
books such that (Ŵ2 = w2|W2 = w2) is jointly-typical with
Y. The attacker, who has the access to the stego image Y,
but not to the K2, has to look through all codebooks |K2| for
a jointly-typical pair (Ŵ2, Y). The probability of decoding
error for the attacker, P A(N )e , will be upper bounded by:
P A(N )e ≤ |K2|2N R22−N (I (W2;Y )−),
≤ 2N 1N log2 |K2|2N (R2−I (W2;Y )+),
≤ 2N ( 1N log2 |K2|+R2−I (W2;Y )+). (27)
Therefore, if R2 ≤ I (W2; Y )− − 1N log2 |K2|, P A(N )e → 0
as N → ∞.
Moreover, the data-hider having attacked data V looks
for the jointly-typical (Ŵ2, V) pair in a particular codebook
determined by K2 and the probability of decoding error for
the data-hider, P DH(N )e , is bounded by (5). Thus, if R2 ≤
I (W2; V |K2) − , P DH(N )e → 0 as N → ∞.
In order to prove that the attacker can also decode W2
reliably from Y without knowledge of K2 when the data-
hider can do the same from V with knowledge of K2, we
will try to investigate the relationship between I (W2; Y ) and
I (W2; V |K2) that bounds R2 for the attacker and for the
data-hider, respectively, in the case of reliable communica-
tions. From data processing inequality [12]:
I (W2; V ) ≤ I (W2; Y ). (28)
Furthermore, based on the extension of I (W2; V, K2) using
chain rule for mutual information:
I (W2; V, K2) = I (W2; V ) + I (W2; K2|V ),
= I (W2; K2) + I (W2; V |K2). (29)
and the fact that I (W2; K2) = I (W2; K2|V ) = 0, we
can prove that I (W2; V ) = I (W2; V |K2). Therefore,
I (W2; V |K2) ≤ I (W2; Y ) according to (27) and (28). If
the data-hider selects R2, which satisfies the condition R2 ≤
I (W2; V |K2) −  to be able to decode Ŵ2 reliably, then the
attacker will also be able to decode Ŵ2 with P A(N )e → 0 as
N → ∞ with such R2.
Once the attacker obtains W2, it is subtracted from Y and
a geometrical transformation is applied to (Y − Ŵ2). This
causes the data-hider to loose the synchronization frame-
work.
However, instead of applying a geometrical transforma-
tion to (Y − Ŵ2), the attacker may develop the following
attacks in order to destroy the reliable communications, de-
pending on the statistical codebook design strategy for W2:
• The statistics of W2 are the same for all codebooks[8, 9]:
in this case the knowledge of W2 does not have any sig-
nificance in reaching W1. Thus, the attacker has to per-
form an exhaustive search through all |K1| codebooks
for the jointly-typical (U, (Y − Ŵ2)) pair. The car-
dinality of this U decoding space is |K1|2N (R1+R′). If
the jointly-typical pair is found, it is possible to obtain
the realization of X. The total cardinality of the decod-
ing space for the attacker is bounded by |K2|2N R2 +
|K1|2N (R1+R′).
• The statistics of W2 are different for all user code-
books and there is a one-to-one relationship between
the codebooks of W1 and W2: in such a codebook de-
sign scenario, the knowledge of W2 restricts the search
of the attacker for W1 in a particular codebook. Thus,
the cardinality of the decoding space for the jointly-
typical (U, (Y − Ŵ2)) pair reduces from |K1|2N (R1+R′)
to 2N (R1+R′) when compared to the previous scenario.
Thus, the total cardinality of the decoding space for the
attacker is reduced to |K2|2N R2 + 2N (R1+R′).
• The statistics of W2 are different for all user codebooks
and there is no relationship between the codebooks of
W1 and W2: in this case, the knowledge of W2 does not
facilitate the search of the attacker for W1. Therefore, the
cardinality of the decoding space for the jointly-typical
(U, (Y − Ŵ2)) pair will be |K1|2N (R1+R′). Thus, the to-
tal cardinality of the decoding space for the attacker is
|K2|2N R2 + |K1|2N (R1+R′).
7.3 The effect of security leakages on the cardinality
of the decoding space
In the random coding scenario, where the decoder looks for
a jointly typical (W(M, K ), Y) pair, the attacker, who has
the knowledge of the decoding rule (or decoder) and targets
destroying reliable communications, has to find W(M, K ).
Once W(M, K ) is found, it can be subtracted from Y. Thus,
without knowledge of the key K , one will perform an ex-
haustive search through all codebooks {1, 2, . . . , |K|} and
all messages M = m, m ∈ M for the jointly typical
(W(M, K ), Y) pair. The cardinality of this decoding space
will be |K|2N R , where |K| is the total number of codebooks
and 2N R is the number of codewords per codebook.4
When the codebooks {1, 2, . . . , |K|} are generated in the
way that each one contains unique codewords and every pos-
sible W is included in only one codebook, the exhaustive
search for W is related to the ambiguity H(W) by 2H(W). In
this limit case, the cardinalities |K|2N R and 2H(W) will be
equal.
However, as it was proposed by Shannon [20], observing
Y5 reduces the ambiguity about W from H(W) to H(W|Y)
4 We do not consider here efficient search strategies similar to
Viterbi algorithm space [22].
5 It should be noticed that the attacker operates directly on the stego
data Y contrarily to the data-hider who has access only to the attacked
data V.
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as:
H(W|Y) = H(W) − I (W; Y), (30)
where I (W; Y) is the amount of information that can be
learned about W by observing Y. If H(W|Y) = 0, the
knowledge of the current Y gives the exact value for W,
i.e., the cardinality of the decoding space for the attacker is
2H(W|Y) = 1. Therefore, in a communication scenario with
I (W; Y) = 0, it is possible for the attacker to reduce the
cardinality |K|2N R of the exhaustive search for the jointly
typical (W, Y) pair.
In the case of random binning, where the decoder looks
for a U(M, X, K ) that is jointly typical with the stego
data Y, the attacker will try to find the jointly typical
(U(M, X, K ), Y) pair through all {1, 2, . . . , |K|} codebooks
and all message bins M = m, m ∈ M to be able to destroy
reliable communications. The cardinality of this decoding
space is given by |K|2N (R+R′) where 2N R′ is the total num-
ber of sequences U in each message bin M = m. The knowl-
edge of U enables the attacker to get the host state X, the
message M and the key K .
Similarly to the random coding scenario, when the code-
books are generated by distributing all possible U sequences
to the codebooks uniquely, the cardinality of the decoding
space depends on the ambiguity 2H(U) about U. Therefore,
one would expect the cardinalities |K|2N (R+R′) and 2H(U) to
be equal in the limit case.
However, attacker’s knowledge about the stego data Y
reduces this ambiguity to H(U|Y) as:
H(U|Y) = H(U|X) − [I (U; Y) − I (U; X)]
= H(U) − I (U; Y). (31)
Thus, as in the random coding case, if I (U; Y) = 0, then
the cardinality of the decoding space for the attacker can be
decreased from |K|2N (R+R′) based on the observed Y.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, the conditions of reliable communications
based on structured codebooks in channels with geometrical
transformations are analyzed from an information-theoretic
point of view. Structured codebooks include codewords that
have some features or statistics designed for synchronization
purposes.
The MAC framework is developed to design the capac-
ity achieving data-hiding codes that are robust to geomet-
rical transformations. The corresponding methods based on
the CSE/CSC that are used for reliable communications in
channels with geometrical transformations are classified into
two main groups depending on the particular codebook de-
sign: template-based codebooks and redundant codebooks.
The analysis of security leaks of each codebook structure is
performed in terms of cardinality of the decoding space for
the attacker to design the worst case attack.
As a continuation of our research, we will consider col-
lusion attacks, when there are several stego data copies pro-
duced from different hosts, keys or messages, and will em-
phasize the role of the host data statistics on the security. We
will also extend the proposed set-up to real scenarios, when
the data lengths N are finite, the decoding is performed using
the MMI technique and the probability of error is bounded
in terms of error exponents. The particular search algorithms
reducing the cardinality of the decoding space for the at-
tacker based on the security leakages I (W; Y) and I (U; Y)
are also a subject of our ongoing study.
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